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Since the initial encounters of Micronesians and Europeans in the sixteenth 
century Micronesia has undergone colonial rule by four world powers: Spain 
(mid-1500s to 1899), Germany (1899-1914), Japan (1914-1944), and the 
United States (1944 to the current termination of United Nations trustee-
ship). The first three changes of control between colonial rulers were 
accomplished with little impact on Islanders. When the United States wrested 
control of the area from Japan, however, it was by some of the most 
destructive and bloodiest fighting of World War II. 
World War II was global warfare and Micronesians were caught in the 
middle of the Japanese and Allied contest for the central Pacific. Under 
Japanese military control Micronesians were subjected to harsh discipline, 
forced labor, relocation, and the confiscation of farm products. Some men 
were drafted into the military and took part in the fighting. Other men, 
women, and children worked on military construction and picked up the load 
of extra labor to provide food, clothing, and shelter for themselves and the 
Japanese soldiers and civilians living with them. Micronesians also suffered 
the danger and destruction of Allied military attack, and the material 
shortages and psychological pressures of the war years. 
As Allied forces achieved victory in the Pacific, wartime hardships were 
dramatically replaced by a massive influx of American goods and personnel, 
and Micronesians came under United States administration, which espoused 
democratic ideals and tolerance of native tradition, but had its own agenda for 
the islands' future. The brief, intense period of change during and after the 
war years provided Islanders with novel experiences and understandings of 
themselves and their relationships with foreigners. The results of the impact 
continue to shape Micronesian society. 
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Background 
In order to understand the impact of the war on Micronesia we must begin by 
outlining recent Micronesian history. Spanish colonial control had little direct 
impact on the islands (except for the Marianas); but during the nineteenth 
century traditional life was transformed by contact with European traders and 
missionaries. Most Micronesians became Christians, and mission schools 
operated on the larger islands. Cash was scarce, but people sold copra, crafts, 
and labor to buy cloth, iron tools, and a few other European goods. Still, 
when Germany purchased control of the islands from Spain in 1899 the 
lifestyle of mosl Micronesians centered on fIshing, cultivating taro, breadfruit, 
and other crops, and raising domestic animals. During the German era (1899-
1914) the government encouraged the development of trade and reorganized 
land tenure on·the European model. Health care, child education, and local 
government were for the most part handled by local people themselves, 
although the Germans enforced a legal code. But neither Spain nor Germany 
was a PacifIc power, and these governments were not iQterested in extensive 
change or development of the islands (again, excepting the Spanish in the 
Marianas). 
When Japan allied itself with Britain inWprld War I, the Japanese navy 
moved to take the islands from Germany in 1914. Micronesia was officially 
sanctioned as a League of Natioqs mandate under Japan in 1921. Unlike the 
German and Spanish governments Japan was vitally interested in its PacifIc 
empire; as a result the era of Japanese control saw enormous changes in 
Micronesian life. Japan's interest in the islands was primarily economic and, 
as time went by, strategic. It added the mandated islands to its "inner empire" 
(which included Taiwan, Korea, the Liaotong Peninsula, and the southern 
part of Sakhalin Island). Japan governed its colonial possessions closely, using 
tight bureaucratic control, an effIcient police force, and manipulation of local 
cultural instit'i1tions (such as traditional leaders) to manage the local 
populations (reattie 1988). And there was always strong military support, if 
the colonial administrators need~d it. 
The Japanese government eXpended enormous attention, energy, money, 
and personnel on their island empire, even before the war years (Yanaihara 
1940). The fIrst decades of Japanese control saw the establishment of public 
schools, health services, public works, and an elaborate administrative 
bureaucracy. In the mid-1930s, however, Japanese national interests began to 
supersede concern with the welfare of Islanders as the empire began to 
expand by military action. 
The nature of Japanese impact on Micronesia varied geographically. 
Major factors in social change were immigration by Japanese settlers, 
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economic development, and government control over local life. All of these 
increased throughout the period of Japanese colonial control. The greatest 
changes, significantly transforming local conditions, occurred in the Western 
Pacific, especially on Saipan and the Marianas, the largest islands, where tens 
of thousands of Japanese immigrants came to work on sugar plantations 
owned and run by Japanese. Palau also was much changed by Japan's 
influence. In the Caroline Islands, the high islands saw immigration, industrial 
development, urbanization, and extensive government control. Life on 
smaller atolls in the Caroline and Marshall islands was transformed least by 
the Japanese colonial presence, though even the smallest had a police 
detachment and a school, and were visited by Japanese traders, medical 
personnel, census-takers, and other administrators. 
Japanese traders had operated on a small scale throughout Micronesia 
even during the latter part of the German era. After Japanese takeover both 
trade and industry developed quickly. By 1920 the Japanese South Seas 
Trading Company had a monopoly of the ocean trade, and the South Seas 
Development Company was organizing sugar, marine products, copra 
production, and phosphate extraction throughout the islands. The expansion 
of industry, especially sugar production, increased immigration from Japan to 
the islands--first to Saipan and the Marianas, then to Palau, and eastward 
through Chuuk and the Central Carolines, to Pohnpei. By the mid-1930s 
Islanders were outnumbered by Japanese everywhere except in the Eastern 
Carolines and the Marshall Islands--in 1940, on the eve of the war, 81,000 
Japanese lived in the mandated islands compared with about 50,000 
Micronesians. 
The large-scale immigration of Japanese into the islands coincided with a 
change in Japan's colonial policy. Until the mid-1920s Japan managed its 
colonies based on simple segregation of local people and Japanese. 
Education, for example, consisted of a lower track for colonial people 
(Taiwanese, Koreans, or Micronesians), and a higher track for Japanese. But 
as the Japanese home government increasingly came to be influenced by 
military interests, colonial policy changed. By the late 1920s a theory of 
"Japanization" was introduced, which aimed to spread Japanese language and 
customs to local people, encouraging loyalty to Japan. Despite this policy of 
"assimilation," colonial administrators did not allow local people to expect 
equal rights with Japanese, or opportunities for self-government or Japanese 
citizenship. Promotion of "assimilation" was really a form of social control. By 
the 1930s--as waves of Japanese settlers were pouring into Micronesia--the 
colonial policy of assimilation was intensified in order to strengthen the 
empire. The policy increased in strength from then until the end of the war: 
civil and military administration were constantly emphasizing to Islanders 
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(and other Japanese colonial peoples) that they should be loyal Japanese 
citizens, that they had obligation to the Emperor, and that they should 
sacrifice and bear the burden. of the needs of Japan. 
The result of this thirty-year-Iong educational effort in Micronesia was to 
build up a store of loyalty toward Japanese. Islanders were aware of the 
benefits Japan introduced--including opportunities for wage labor, trade, and 
travel (including travel to Japan), sanitation and health facilities, widespread 
education, and so on. At the same time Islanders recognized the unequal 
treatment they received from Japanese; the colonial educational and police 
system made ~t 'clear that Islanders did not have full legal, political, or 
economic equality with Japanese. For example, Japanese men on Pohnpei 
could many iSland women, but not vice versa./Tbe colonial bureaucracy was 
strict in its administration of law and control of local life. Gradually, as the 
war increased pressure on the Japanese military government, the military's 
harshness toward Micronesians reduced Micronesian goodwill and caused 
~ost Islanders to welcome the American invasion. 
When the war in the Pacific began, the Japanese government in 
Micronesia was prepared psychologically and materially to support the 
advance of Japanese armies in Asia and to defend the empire if necessary. 
Historians disagree about how extensively the islands were fortified before 
war was declared. Mark Peattie, reviewing the question recently, argues that 
there is no good evidence that Japan was preparing for an island war far in 
advance (1988; 247-251). Instead, he says military construction of harbors, 
airstrips, and oil storage facilities began in Micronesia two years before Pearl 
Harbor, and the Fourth Fleet headquartered at Chuuk was only established 
late in 1939. The construction of military bases was not yet completed at the 
time of the first victorious Allied invasion in 1944. But Micronesians were 
affected by the international tension well before the first shots were fired. 
They lost land, jobs, and a sense of being in control of their islands as ever 
greater numbers of Japanese immigrants moved to Saipan, the Marianas, and 
Palau. The m~litary took an increasing interest in colonial administration. 
German and American Christian missionaries were replaced with Japanese 
counterparts. Young men worked in prewar construction projects, and 
everyone was subject to propaganda, economic pressure to help the empire, 
and the shutdown of contact with the rest of the world. 
On the eve of the war, then, we see the Japanese actively preparing for 
conflict and demanding additional efforts and loyalty from Micronesians. On 
their part, Islal;lders were ambivalent: they acknowledged the power and 
authority of the Japanese and recognized the improvements and 
opportunities of Japanese rule; but they also saw that they were losing control 
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of their own lands to Japanese immigrants, and they increasingly resented the 
harsh discipline and demands of the military presence on the islands. 
Prewar history is critical in comparing Micronesian and Melanesian 
wartime experiences. Of course, the two areas are geographically different, 
with peoples quite distinct in culture and political organization. Colonial 
histories also differ, though both populations were largely Christian, and were 
involved in trade, wage labor, and exposure to foreign ideas in the years 
before the war. Most notably, though, Micronesia was an integral part of the 
Japanese empire, and for thirty years Micronesians had been governed, 
educated, propagandized, and given orders by Japanese. This colonial 
experience was both positive and negative for Micronesians. Both feelings 
were expressed during the war. 
The War 
For most Micronesians the war began with small-scale, local increases in the 
military presence. Transportation and supply facilities were upgraded; 
construction of military bases began; the Japanese navy joined small trading 
ships on the ocean horizons; and Japanese soldiers were billeted on nearly 
every island. Aside from a few American attacks on the Marshall Islands in 
early 1942, Micronesia did not experience warfare directly during the first 
years of the war--until the American invasion came with a vengeance at the 
beginning of 1944. 
From Pearl Harbor in 1941 until 1944 Micronesia played the role of the 
rest of the "inner empire" surrounding Japan itself: as a support system for the 
fighting in Asia and in the Southwest Pacific. Chuuk became increasingly 
important as a base to support the Japanese navy in the Solomon Islands 
battles, even though the Japanese Navy's great battleships spent much of the 
war sitting in Chuuk Lagoon, waiting for the "decisive encounter" with the US 
Pacific Fleet that never came. This waiting period was important in building 
the American myth of Chuuk as an impregnable fortress, and the idea that 
Micronesia was fortified to the hilt and would be extremely difficult to attack. 
Many books have been written about Japanese and Allied strategy in the 
Pacific War. To state Micronesia's place in high-level military plans briefly is 
not simple. From the Japanese viewpoint the empire was a series of 
concentric circles, with the home islands of Japan at its center. As the war 
progressed, and the Japanese military shifted from an offensive to a defensive 
posture, high command continually redrew a "defensive perimeter" that all 
loyal subjects were commanded to defend. This perimeter was repeatedly 
narrowed, as Allied forces penetrated closer to the home islands from the 
east and the south. The Japanese military followed a deliberate policy of 
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"letting go" of outer perimeters as it became unfeasible to supply and support 
them. Japan h()arded its strength for the anticipated final defensive battles; 
the fighting became more intense as it drew nearer to Japan itself. 
On the Allied side, strategy was aimed at reaching Japan as swiftly as 
possible. By the spring of 1943 Allied resources were sufficient to open a 
fighting front in the Central Pacific, while continuing the Southwest Pacific 
offensive. A compromise between army and navy, and among the Allies, 
provided a plan to open a second "road to Tokyo" by a westward sweep 
through Micronesia~ eventually to link up with Allied forces moving north 
through the Solomons and New Guinea for the final assault on the 
Philippines a~d, if need be, on Japan itself. Itremained unclear for several 
months which Micronesian islands would be attacked, and in what order. 
Allied high command had little information about the extent and distribution 
of Japanese strength in the area, and little experience, at first, with 
amphibious warfare (Morison 1947-1962). 
By late 1943 the Japanese navy was short of supplies. Their losses in the 
defense of the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago meant that they 
could not effectively counter any large-scale central Pacific attack. The 
commander ofthe Japanese Fourth Fleet drew a new defensive perimeter, 
leaving the Gilberts and Marshalls outside of it. They would not be seriously 
defended, though troops already there were expected to fight to their deaths. 
Meanwhile Allied naval strategists were choosing their first point of attack on 
the new Pacific front. The Japanese fleet was based at Chuuk, which seemed 
well protected by its screen of islands; therefore, the Americans decided to 
attack the Marshall Islands first. To do that they needed an air base within 
bombing distance. The Gilbert Islands (now part of Kiribati) were chosen as 
their first Micronesian target. 
Chronology 
The first Allied landings in Micronesia took place in the Gilberts in 
November 1943, with a massively destructive bombardment and land invasion 
of Tarawa. The fighting war had come to Micronesia, and from this day on it 
increased in intensity without pause. After Tarawa, air and surface 
bombardment of the Marshall Islands began, and continued for two months. 
Kwajalein was invaded on 31 January .1944; the attack on critical Enewetak 
was planned for February. In support of these attacks Pohnpei, Kosrae, 
Wake, and other Marshall Islands were repeatedly shelled and bombed. 
In February 1944 the major American strike on Chuuk destroyed 200,000 
tons of Japanese shipping. But Admiral Koga had ordered his major warships 
out of Chuuk two weeks before, pulling them back to Palau, assuming that 
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eastern Micronesia was lost and intending to hold a new line of defense 
between the Marianas and the western Carolines. The attack on Chuuk blew 
up one of the Allies great myths of Japanese power in Micronesia; the 
Enewetak invasion on the same day cleared the way for the US takeover of 
the Marshalls. 
At that point the Allies decided to "bypass" Pohnpei and Chuuk--that is, 
to hit them by air and sea attack and "neutralize" them as military bases, but 
not to make a land invasion. See chapters 8 and 11 for what this meant to 
people on the islands that were "bypassed" or "neutralized." It did not mean 
they were out of the war. It did mean that they were cut off from supplies and 
. support from the remaining parts of the empire. Except for a few submarines, 
which could carry very little, the "bypassed" islands had no access to outside 
supplies; they were effectively incapable of either offensive or defensive 
.. military action; they were subject to air and surface bombardment; and, as the 
months went by, the people--J apanese and Micronesian--were increasingly 
concerned simply with staying alive. The military on some islands, it seems, 
simply abandoned Japanese and Micronesian civilians, leading to a general 
scramble to avoid starvation. 
By the end of February 1944 the United States had taken control of 
800,000 square miles of ocean, and forced the effective Japanese resistance 
back to the extreme western Pacific. Former Japanese bases in the Gilberts 
and Marshalls were turned into American bases; Japanese were killed or 
taken prisoner; Islanders were experiencing their first lengthy encounters 
with Americans (discussed elsewhere in this volume). The US Navy, prepared 
with civil affairs officers and plans for handling conquered populations, began 
to organize the next phase of Micronesia's history: the American era (Richard 
1957). 
Although the central Micronesian islands were not invaded by Americans 
after the conquest of the Marshalls, they were still in the war. Chuuk, 
Satawal, Pohnpei, and other islands were repeatedly attacked, and Japanese 
repeatedly tried to use them as air and submarine bases. Island men were 
conscripted as labor for the Japanese, sometimes working while bombs were 
falling. Men and women worked overtime to produce badly needed food ~nd 
tried to maintain community life under wartime stress. While these central 
Caroline Islands were "bypassed," the bulk of American military might in the 
central Pacific was converging on the Marianas, where Saipan had become 
the chief Japanese headquarters for the central Pacific. The desperate 
fighting on Saipan and the Marianas is well known to military history; it began 
on 15 June 1945 with the first attack on Saipan; the battle for Saipan lasted 
twenty-four days. Guam was invaded on 21 July; Tinian on 24 July. Fighting 
on nil these islands was long and bloody, with great devastation and death for 
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people on all sides. Islanders were vastly outnumbered on most of these 
islands, which had larger civilian Japanese populations. The final days of the 
war in the western Pacific were marked by horror for civilians, culminating in 
the mass suicides of Japanese civilians on Saipan. But the Allied conquest of 
the Marianas meant that American planes could now reach the Japanese 
mainland with their bombs, and the end of the war was in sight. 
The end of the war in the Micronesian islands came on 30 August 1945 
when Japan's South Sea Island forces made their official surrender in Chuuk. 
During the next months Japanese were repatriated, leaving Islanders with 
their new administrators, the American navy. The war in the Pacific was over. 
But for Micronesians the meaning and the memory of the war would never 
end. 
The Impacts of the War 
Although American, European, and Japanese historians have produced 
voluminous documentation of Western and Asian experiences of the Pacific 
theater of World War II, they seldom include information about the effects of 
wartime operations on local people. Most Micronesian memories of the war 
are preserved in songs and stories, which are only now being collected to give 
us detailed knowledge of daily life during the war, and the impact of Japanese 
colonial and military activity, large-scale conflict, and initial American 
occupation on Islanders. I can only outline some of the most significant and 
lasting impacts of the wartime era, and briefly compare Micronesian 
experiences with those of Melanesia. 
Wartime experiences varied considerably among the island groups of 
Micronesia. The Marshall Islands lay at the eastern periphery ofthe Japanese 
empire; they were the springboards for Japan's early attacks on the United 
States and were the site of the first American attacks on the Japanese. 
Marshall Islanders were also the first Micronesians to experience the new 
American colonial policies. Pohnpei, in the Eastern Carolines, held an 
important seaplane base and a large Japanese urban area. After Pohnpei was 
cut off from the Japanese empire by American forces, people there had to 
intensify local agricultural production, and they suffered shortages of 
imported manufactured goods such as cloth. On nearby Kosrae numerous 
Japanese and Islanders were relocated to a labor camp, where they had to 
remain when communication with the empire was cut off. The populations far 
exceeded Kosrae's agricultural capacity, so that starvation and sickness set in. 
Chuuk and Yap, which shared similar economic and social wartime stresses, 
were more prominent in Japanese military plans. Yap held a seaplane base; 
Chuuk Lagoon was a major naval base, home to the Japanese combined fleet 
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until the American conquest of the Marshall Islands. Japanese air and 
submarine attacks were launched from Chuuk and Yap as late as the US 
invasion of Saipan (June 1944). The central and eastern Caroline Islands 
were subject to American attack throughout this period. After the Japanese 
gave up the defense of the eastern islands, Palau, the Marianas, and Saipan 
were reinforced heavily with army and navy forces, making them the eye of 
the war hurricane: on these islands physical destruction and human suffering 
were most intense. 
Physically the war changed the face of all the islands. Japanese and 
Islanders had invested much effort and money in the construction of harbors, 
airports, cities, electricity-generating plants, and local industries--all were des-
troyed. Under the administration of the US Navy new systems of employment 
and trade had to be established. Medical care, education, and government 
services had to be built up again. 
Other aspects of life also changed as a result of the war. Women had a 
greater role in work and in leadership while men were away from home; they 
brought these wartime experiences back to their families and peacetime lives. 
Young men had traveled more widely than their fathers; they had met people 
from other parts of the Pacific; and they came home with new ideas and 
aspirations. The great material wealth displayed by both sides, especially by 
Americans, suggested to Islanders a new standard of economic and industrial 
potential. Unlike Melanesians, for whom encounters with American troops 
were a brief interlude, Micronesians were about to begin a lengthy relation-
ship with the United States. 
Comparisons with Melanesia 
Many of the impacts of the war affected Micronesians and Melanesians 
similarly. Both suffered the danger and destruction of bombardment from 
Allies (Micronesians were less subject to Japanese attack). Some Micronesian 
men, like Melanesians, served in combat, including volunteers who served in 
the Japanese Army far from home in Southeast Asia and New Guinea. Most 
adult men worked as conscripted labor for the Japanese, and some moved 
from island to island as they were ordered. Other men, women, and young 
people carried on at home, laboring overtime to produce food and other 
necessities not only for themselves, but also for Japanese. For all Pacific 
Islanders the major stresses of the war were danger, starvation, absence from 
or loss of family, social dislocation, and population movement. 
But though both Micronesia and Melanesia were key strategic areas in 
the Pacific War, people in the two regions experienced the war in very 
different ways. These differences are due to traditional cultural and social 
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distinctions, the degree of direct involvement with occupying forces, the 
nationality of occupying forces, and even differences between army and navy 
approaches to civilian populations. Micronesians had lived under Japanese 
rule for thirty years when the navy-led American invasion changed their world 
in a matter of months. Melanesians, who had been living under various 
European colonial governmnents, were caught in intense back-and-forth 
fighting between Japanese and Allied forces. After the war, control of many 
Micronesian islands was demanded and achieved by the US military for 
security reasons, with many islands placed under navy control. Melanesia, 
again divided among the colonial powers (who had economic, as well as 
strategic, uses for the region), experienced a diversity of postwar policy 
impacts. Micronesians saw the end of the war as a change to a new era; 
American administration changed almost every aspect of political and 
economic life. Melanesians found that the British, French, and Australians 
who returned to their colonies after the war wanted to return to "life as 
usual." These returning colonialists were met by Melanesians who had seen a 
wider world and developed new ideas, which they wanted to translate into 
new ways of life. Postwar political activity, then, was quite different in the two 
regions, although populations in both regions have achieved political 
independence. 
, Conclusion 
With the end of the war in the Pacific came the end of Japanese colonial 
administration in Micronesia. It was hard to predict what the future would 
hold. Americans had mixed feelings about their new island possessions. On 
the one hand they wanted firm control of military bases in Micronesia, and 
they wanted the loyalty of Micronesian people. On the other hand the United 
States believed in self-government and did not want to be seen as a colonial 
power. The administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands devel-
oped within this double set of American intentions. The modern outcome of 
the American military conquest of Micronesia, as we see today, is 
Micronesian independence, with a variety of special relationships with the 
United States. 
I have provided a very broad outline of the context of Micronesian 
experiences of the war years. Following chapters take up specifics of what life 
was like for people who lived through that time--people who have given us 
their memories, so that we too can learn about it. 
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